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MIT
Abstract. I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are
optimistic about their bargaining power (measmred as the probabihty of making
offers), but learn as they play the game. I show that there exists a uniquely
predetermined settlement date, such that in equilibrium the players always
reach an agreement at that date, but never reach one before it. Given any
discount rate, if the learning is sufficiently slow, the players agree immediately.
I show that, for any speed of learning, the agreement is delayed arbitrarily long,
provided that the players are sufficiently patient. Therefore, although excessive
optimism alone cannot cause delay, it can cause long delays if the players are
expected to learn.
KEYWORDS: Bargaining, Misperception, Optimism, Delay, Learning
1. Introduction
Bargaining delays are common, and frequently cause substantial losses to the bargain-
ing parties. Often, agreements in labor negotiations are reached only after strikes or
work slowdowns, and sometimes international conflicts last generations, costing lives
and causing lifelong misery. (This might happen while the parties are ofRcially ne-
gotiating a peace agreement, as in the case of Israeli-Palestinian conflict.) The usual
game-theoretical explanation for these delays is based on asymmetric information:
delay is a credible means for a player to communicate his private information that
he has a strong position in bargaining, or a screening device to understand whether
the other party is in a strong or weak position in bargaining (see Admati and Perry
(1987) and Kennan and Wilson (1993)).
There is, however, a sense among researchers that agreement may be delayed even
when the parties do not seem to have any asymmetric information about the payoffs.
As an alternative cause of bargaining delays, many authors have proposed excessive
*This paper is based on my dissertation, submitted to Stanford Graduate School of Business. I
am grateful to my advisor Robert Wilson for his guidance and continuous help. Many results in
this paper were also reported in the working paper Yildiz (2001). I thank Daron Acemoglu, Abhijit
Banerjee, Chaya Bhuvaneswar, Glenn Ellison, Yossi Feinberg, Casey Rothschild, and the seminar
participants at BU, Chicago, Harvard, MEDS, MIT, Princeton, Rochester, Stanford, UBC, USC,
Western Ontario, and Yale for helpful comments.
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optimism due to the lack of a common prior. ^ Based on surveys and experimental and
field data, they have concluded that optimism is very common, and have attributed
the bargaining delays to excessive optimism. Most of these authors do not have any
formal model, but their arguments appear to be based on the two-period negotiation
model by Landes (1971) and Posner (1972). Their reasoning seems to be the following.
When each pa v is excessively optimistic about the share he would get tomorrow,
there may not t st any settlement today that satisfies all parties' expectations. In
another paper {\ 'z (2002)), I have shown that this argiunent reUes critically on the
artificial assumptii a that there are only two-periods; in a long horizon model there
will be an immediate agreement whenever optimism is sufficiently persistent. The
reason is that, if optimism is persistent, then the scope of trade is necessarily small,
and thus the players cannot be very optimistic about their share in any agreement in
the near future.
This paper piovides a new rationale for delay when the parties are optimistic due
to the lack of a common prior. Now there is no private information to convey; a player
i simply believes that he has a strong position in bargaining, a belief the other player
j does not share. Being a Bayesian, i must also believe that the events are likely to
proceed in such a way that i wiU eventually be proven to be right. In that case, j
will plausibly be convinced that i is right and thereby be persuaded to agree to i's
terms. If j's initial beliefs are not too firm, this will happen so soon that i will find
it worth waiting to persuade j. Of course, at the begimiing, j does not believe that
the e.ents will proceed in that way; she probably thinks that i will be persuaded to
agree to her terms in the near future. This leads to costly delays that are inefficient
even under these optimistic beliefs.
As a formal model, I use the basic model of Yildiz (2002) but focus on the case
that the players' initial befiefs are not too firm, allowing them to update their behefs
without restriction. (Yildiz (2002) focuses on the case that the players do not change
their beliefs much as they play the game.) Using a canonical model of learning, I
show that there exists a (unique) predetermined date t* such that in equilibrium the
players will never agree before t* and reach an agreement at t*. (Moreover, they
would also have agreed at any date after t*, had they not agreed before.) Notice that
the settlement date t* is common knowledge at the beginning and does not depend
on what happens until then. This is surprising, because delay in usual bargaining
models—whether caused by signaling, screening, or ixiixed strategies—is only a pos-
'See Hicks (1932), Landes (1971), Posner (1972), Gould (1973), Priest and Klein (1984), Neale
and Bazerman (1985), Babcock et al (1995), Babcock and Loewenstein (1997). See also Farber and
Bazerman (1989), who showthat excessive optimism cannot explain the delay patterns in certain
labor negotiations with conventional and final offer arbitration. Some other terms, such as over-
confidence and self-serving biases, are also used for what can be called optimism in the present
context.
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sibility and there is immediate agreement with positive probabihty. Finding very
tight bounds for the settlement time t*, I further show that delay can be arbitrarily
long as long as the players are sufficiently patient. This is true for any initial level
of optimism and the firmness of beliefs. Therefore, although optimism alone cannot
cause any delay, it can cause delays when it is combined with learning.
The intuition is as above. As is typical in Bayesian learning models, each player
i updates Ms beliefs relatively quickly at the beginning of the process. When his
bargaining partner j is patient enough, tliis entices j to wait so that i will observe
the truth and hopefully agree to j's terms. After a while, having gained experience
through observing some of the data, the players' learning wiU slow down, and it
will no longer be worth waiting for them to change their minds. This is when they
reach an agreement. Of course, in the mean time, as the players observe the same
data, their beliefs become more similar and eventually optimism becomes negligible.
Nevertheless, the upper bound for t* implies that the players reach an agreement
when the learning slows down—and much before optimism becomes neghgible.
In the next section, I lay out the model and develop the main concepts. The main
results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 extend these results to a continuous-
time model, and Section 5 concludes. Most of the proofs are presented in a technical
appendix, where I develop the notions and the tools that are necessary for these
proofs.
2. Model
Take the set of all non-negative integers T = {0, 1, 2, . . .} as the time space. Take also
A'' = {1,2} to be the set of players, and U = {u e [0, l]^|u^ -I- u^ < 1} to be the set
of all feasible expected utility pairs. Designate dates t,s ^ T and players i ^ j & N
as generic members.
I will analyze the following perfect-information game. At each t E T, Nature
recognizes a player i E N; i offers a utility pair u = {u^,u^) G f/; if the other player
accepts the offer, then the game ends, yielding a payoff vector 6^u = {6*u^,6^u^) for
some S e (0, 1); otherwise, the game proceeds to date ^4-1. If the players never agree,
each gets 0. I assume that the players' beUefs have beta distributions, a tractable
distribution that is widely used in statistical learning models. Fixing any positive
integers fhi, fh2, and n with 1 < m2 < fhi < n — 2, I assume that, for any given dates
t and s with 5 > ^, at the beginning of date ^, if a player i observes that player 1 has
made m offers (and player 2 has made t — m offers), then he assigns probability
fhj+m . .
t + n ^
^
to the event that player 1 will make an offer at date s. This belief structure arises
when each player believes that recognition at different dates are identically and inde-
pendently distributed with some unknown parameter /i measuring the probability of
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player 1 making an offer at any date t, and // is distributed with a beta distribution
with parameters m, and n. I assume that everytliing described in tliis paragraph is
common knowledge.
As in Yildiz (2002), this model differs from the Rubinstein-StaW framework by
allowing different probability distributions for different players. This difference in
beliefs about the recognition process can be taken as the difference in beliefs about
each player's bargaining power. TMs is because in sequential bargaining models,
including the present one, a player's bargaining power is ultimately determined by
the recognition process, as the following two results suggest. First, Lemma 5 below
establishes that a player's equilibrium payoff is the present value of all rents he expects
to extract when he makes offers in the future. Second, under the assiunptions of this
paper, a player i becomes better off in equilibrium whenever each player comes to
believe that i has a higher probability of recognition in the future.
Measuring optimism. Towards measuring optimism, write A = fhi — fh2-
While n measures the firmness of the players' prior beliefs, A/n will be shown to
measure the initial level of optimism. Notice that the behefs about s at t depend
only on t —not s. Hence, optimism will be measiu'ed at the time the behefs are held
without distinguisliing which future recognition these beliefs are about. Write (m, i)
for the history (at the begimiing of date t) in which player 1 has ma,de m offers and
player 2 has made t — m offers. Write p\ (m) for the probabiUty player i assigns at
(m, t) to the event that he wiU be recognized at any fixed date s > t. By (2) below,
pj (m) +pj [rn] > 1, and hence each player thinks at {m,t) that the probabihty that
he will be recognized at date s is higher than what the other player assesses. As
explained above, this means that they are optimistic at {m,t). Write
yt {m) = p] {m) + pj {m) - 1
for the level of optimism at {m,t). By (1),
, ,
nil — 1^2 A „ .^
ytM = ' = 7—- > 0. 2
t + n t + n
Note that yt is deterministic^ i.e., yt does not depend on m; so m will be suppressed.
This determinism is due to the assmnption that the players' beliefs are equally firm,
i.e., n is same for both players. Tliis will simpUfy the analysis dramatically.
Negligible levels of optimism. Let us say that a level yt of optimism is negli-
gible if and only if yt can never cause a disagreement at t — 1. Now, the best a player
can expect at f — 1 from the future is to take the whole dollar at t if he is recognized
at t. Hence, he can expects at most p\ from the future. Thus, the players must
agree at i — 1 whenever 6 [p] +pf) = 6{1 + yt) < 1, i.e., whenever yt < (1 — 6) /S.
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Moreover, if the game were expected to end at t, the recognized player would take
the whole dollar at i. In that case, there would be disagreement at t — 1 whenever
yt > (1—5) /6. Therefore, I will say that optimism is negligible at t if and only if
t/t < (1 — 6) jb. Optimism becomes neghgible in this sense at
b ^
to = tA - n,
i. —
and remains neghgible thereafter.
3. Agreement and Delay
In this section, I show that there exists a predetermined t* such that the players will
never agree before t* , and agree at t* (and thereafter if they had not yet agreed).
Finding very tight boimds for the settlement date t* , I show that (i) the agreement
can be delayed arbitrarily long, provided that the players are sufficiently patient, and
(ii) the agreement is reached when learning slows down, and much before optimism
becomes neghgible (i.e., t* < y/to ).
Towards this end, I first present two agreement results in the spirit of Yildiz
(2002), who proves similar results under the restrictive assumption that the players
do not learn. The first result states that there will be immediate agreement if the
optimism is expected to drop slowly.
Theorem 1. For any t with yt — yt+i < (1 — 5) /b, there is an agreement regime at
t- 1.
Proof. Most proofs are in the Appendix.
That is, in equilibrium there is an immediate agreement as long as it is known
that the level of optimism will not drop dramatically in the near future, i.e., the
learning will be slow. Theorem 1 imphes that the players will agree immediately
whenever y\ — y2 < [l — b) jb. As an immediate corollary, this further implies that
if the players' beliefs are sufficiently firm, they will reach an agreement immediately
— independent of the initial level of optimism, extending another agreement result
in Yildiz (2002):
CoroIIctry 1 . Let A = nyo so that the initial level of optimism remains constant
at yo- Then, there exists some integer n such that the players reach an agreement
immediately whenever n>n.
Proof. By (2), y\ — y2 = („+n°(n+2) ' which converges to zeros a n ^ oo.
Therefore, there exists some integer n such that, whenever n > n,yi—y2 < {1 — b) /b,
yielding an immediate agreement by Theorem 1.
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The main focus of the present paper is on the case that the players' initial beliefs
are not firm, and hence they update their beliefs substantially as they observe how
players are recognized. In that case, the players may delay the agreement for a while,
as the next theorem will imply.
Theorem 2. There exists a t* e T such that, at each t > t*, the players reach an
agreement immediately if they have not reached an agreement yet, and they do not
reach an agreement before t*.
Theorem 2 estabhshes that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date
t*. In a moment I will also provide bounds for t* and show that t* can be arbitrarily
large when players are siifRciently patient. Hence, Theorem 2 implies that, unless
the players' initial behefs are very fiirm, agreement wiU be delayed for a while. This
is because, typically, at the begimiing of a learning process players are more open
to new information, in the sense that they update their behefs substantially as they
observe which player gets a chance to make an offer. Knowing this, each player waits,
beMeving that the events are very likely to proceed in such a way that liis opponent will
change his mind. As time passes, they become experienced. In this way, two things
occur simultaneously, both facilitating agreement. Firstly, having similar experiences,
the discrepancy in their behefs diminishes. More importantly, each player i becomes
so closed minded that his opponent j loses her hope to convince i and thus becomes
more willing to agree to fs terms. Therefore, after a while, they reach an agreement.
It will be clear that in this process, the latter effect leads the players to an agreement
much before the former effect starts playing a role, i.e., yt — yt+i becomes smaller
than (1 — 8) /8 much before yt does (see the discussion after Lemma 1).
At the beginning of the game it is common knowledge that they will not reach an
agreement mitil t*, when they vnll reach an agreement no matter what happens up
to that point. ^ How they will share the pie at t* will depend on how many times each
player will have been recognized. Since they disagree about how many times each
player is likely to be recognized by t* , there is no consensus among the players on how
they can better each of them by agreeing on a decision at the beginning. Therefore,
they wait until t* even though there is a consensus among them that there is an
agreement at the begirming that would leave each player better off.
How long will they delay the agreement? To answer tliis question, the next result
provides tight bounds for t*.
Lemma 1. The settlement time t* satisfies
max{0, ti} <t* < max{0, i„} (3)
In contrast, typically, delay is only a possibility in models with asymmetric information, such
as Admati and Perry (1987).
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where
^ ^ IS ^
in = n (4)
and U is the highest integer t such that s = t + n satisfies the cubic inequaUty
f = {1 - 8) s {s + 1) {s + 2) - 2{s + 1) 6A + 6s6A + {SAf < 0. (5)
Lemma 1 provides tight boimds for delay. These bounds have two important
imphcations for this paper. Firstly, the upper bovind i^ implies that the players settle
much before to = f^ " '^' when optimism becomes negligible. This is stated in the
next result.
Theorem 3. The settlement time t* satisRes
t* < max{0,i„} < ^/t^
whenever to > 0.
Proof. If tu < 0, then the inequality is trivially true. Assume that tu > 0.
By definition, tu + n = ^Iq + n + 1/4 — 1/2 < ^JIq + n. Hence, (t„ + n) < t^ + n,
yielding t^<tQ- (2t„ + n - 1) n < fo-
That is, the agreement is reached when the learning slows down, not when opti-
mism becomes neghgible. This observation is also supported by the fact that there is
immediate agreement when optimism remains always high (cf. Section 4). Therefore,
in reaching an agreement, considerations about learning seem to be more important
than optimism itself.
Second, as the players become very patient, the lower bound goes to oo, yielding
arbitrarily long delays:
Theorem 4. For all [t, n, A), there exists 5 G (0, 1) such that t* > t whenever 6 > 6.
Proof. Given any {t,n, A), since n > A, we have
lim / = -A (t + n + 2 - A) < 0,
5—^1
where / is as defined in (5). Then, there exists 6 E (0, 1) such that, whenever 6 > 6,
we have / < 0, and thus, by Lemma 1, t < ti <t*.
Intuitively, as the players become patient, the efficiency loss due to delay becomes
negligible, wlule each player's individual gain from proving his bargaining power
remains substantial, enticing the players to wait arbitrarily long. To see this consider
the limiting case that y = 0. In that case, the per-period efficiency loss due to delay
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is 1 — (5, approaching as 5 ^^ 1. On the other hand, by (9) in the Appendix, the
continuation value of a player i at any {m,t) is p] [m), and hence any increase in
p\ {m) is translated to the equihbrium payoff of i, without vanishing as 6 —;> 1.
As the players become very patient, although delay becomes arbitrarily long, the
efficiency loss due to delay becomes negligible—as Theorem 3 imphes:
Corollary 2. For all n and A, limg_i 6^ = I, where t* is as defirjed in Theorem 2.
Proof. By (4) , as 5 -> 1 , log 6^ = y^A/ (1 - 6) log <5 ^ 0. Hence, by Theorem
3, 1 > lim6_i 6'' > lim^^i 6^ = 1.
This corollary is due to the fact that when the players are patient, it costs arbi-
trarily little to wait until tu = \/to, when learning slows down. In contrast, for patient
players, the cost of waiting rmtil to (when optimism becomes neghgible) is bounded
away from zero.
4. Delay in a continuous-time limit
In this section, I take a continuum of real times r as the primitive, and approximate
it with a grid of index-times t. The players' time preferences and the level of opti-
mism are given by the real time, and do not depend on the grid. Using Lemma 1, I
find bounds for the real-time hmit r* of the settlement date i*as the grid approaches
continuum. I show that the results in the previous section extend to this model:
although there is immediate agreement when the optimism is very persistent or in-
stantaneously vanisliing, there is delay in between. As the players become sufficiently
patient, the real-time delay becomes arbitrarily long.
Taking a continuum of real times r, let the level of optimism at r be
1 -t-T/TT
where j/o is the initial level of optimism and tt > is a parameter measuring the
persistence of optimism. Given any r > 0, y (r) decreases to zero as tt approaches 0,
and increases to y^ as tt -^ oo. Each player's utility from getting x at r is e~'''"x where
r > is the real-time impatience. Now consider a grid of index times t where each
index t corresponds to a real time r (i, k) = t/k, and fc > measures the fineness of
the grid. The discount rate is 6 [k) = e"''/'^. Take also n = ixk and A = yoU so that
the level of optimism at a given real time r (f , k) is A/ (n + t) = yo/{^ + t {t, k) /n) =
y (r {t, k)) as in (6). Given any k, let t* {k) be the settlement time, defined in Theorem
2 for the parameters 6 = e"'"/'', n = nk and A = y^n. Write also r* for the limit of
T {t* {k)
,
/c) as fc —> oo. Building on Lemma 1, the next theorem provides bomids for
the real-time delay as the discrete-time grid approaches the continuum.
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Theorem 5. In the model of this section, the settlement time t* = limfc_»oo ''" {i* {k) , k)
in the continuous-time limit satisfies
r < T„ = max \ \j tt, (J
T > \ — TT.
Moreover, ifyoTfr < 4/27, then
3r
Finally, given any yo and any tt, t* -^ oo as r -^ 0.
Firstly, consistent with the agreement results, the upper botmd r^ imphes that
there is immediate agreement (i.e., r* = 0) whenever n > yo/r, i.e., when optimism
is very persistent. When < tt < yo/r, there may be delay, although delay must
become arbitrarily short as tt approaches 0. The lower bound implies that there will
be delay whenever < tt < yo/ (3r).
Second, both of the upper and the lower bounds for delay are weakly increasing
in yo/r. This is intuitive because yo scales the speed of learning as well as the
level of optimism, while r measures the players' impatience. The settlement time is
determined by when the learning slows down in terms of the players' patience. As r
decreases, the players become patient, increasing the length of delay. As r approaches
0, the discount rate approaches 1, and r* goes to infinity for any iryo > 0, extending
Theorem 4 to the present setup. Therefore, in the continuous-time limit, there will be
very long real-time delays if the players are patient, optimistic, and can learn about
their bargaining power in the process of bargaining.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a new rationale for bargaining delays based on optimism and
learning. It observes that when two optimistic, Bayesian players negotiate, each player
i believes that the events are likely to proceed in such a way that i will eventually be
proven right. If the other player j's initial beliefs are not too firm, this will entice i
to wait in the hopes that j will quicky learn that i is right and thereby be persuaded
to agree to z's terms. This yields costly delays that may be arbitrarily long and are
inefficient even under these optimistic beliefs. In this reasoning the considerations
about learning seem to be more salient than optimism itself. In fact, the players
settle when the players' learning slows down, and much before optimism becomes
negligible. Moreover, they will settle immediately whenever the level of optimism is
expected to remain high for a long while. In conclusion, although excessive optimism
alone cannot cause delays, it can cause long delays when the players are expected to
learn in the future.
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A. Appendix: A more technical exposition
Notation. Designate a utility pair u = (u^,u^) e [/ as a generic member, and write
p = {pi)^^j- for the recognition process. Write P* {\m,i) for the probabihty assessment of
a player i at any history (m,t) and E^ {-Im^t) for the corresponding expectation operator.
A.l. Preliminary Results. This section contains certain results that are necessary
for the main results in the text. Here, I describe the subgame-perfect equilibria (henceforth,
simply equilibria), and I find simple expressions for the equilibrium payoffs. The first result
is taken from Yildiz (2002):
Lemma 2. Given any {m,t,i), there exists a unique V^ {m) G [0,1] sucii that, at any
subgame-perfect equilibrium, the continuation value ofi at {m,t) is Vf (m).
That is, there is a unique equilibrium payoff-vector. All equilibria yield the same out-
come, so the trivial multiplicity of equilibria will be ignored. Towards describing the equi-
librium behavior, write St = Vj^ + V^ for the perceived size of the pie at the beginning of
date t. The next lemma simplifies the analysis substantially.
Lemma 3. For each t, St is deterministic, i.e., St {m) = St (m') for all m and m.'.
Proof. {Sketch—see Yildiz (2001) for a complete hut tedious proof.) The infinite-
horizon game here can be truncated at some t, by assigning (0,0) as the payoff vector at i.
Moreover, it can be seen from Lemma 5 below that, if Ss is deterministic for each s > f , so
is St- By induction, St must be deterministic in the truncated game. Letting i —* oo, one
obtains the lemma.
Equilibrium behavior and bargaining power. Assume that 6St+i < 1. Now,
if the players agree at t, then the total gain from trade is 1, while it is only i55(+i if they
delay the agreement to the next date. Hence, the recognized player i has all the bargaining
power on realizing the gain of size l — 6St+i that they can get by not delaying the agreement.
He uses this temporal monopoly power to extract 1 — 6St+i as a rent. He gives the other
player j her continuation value SV^^^, and keeps the rent 1 — 6St+i plus his continuation
value 6Vl_^i for himself. His share sums up to 1 — ^Vj^j. When 6St+i > 1, there cannot
be any agreement at t that satisfies both players' expectations, hence they disagree at t.
There is no rent in that case. I will say that there is an agreement (resp., disagreement)
regime at t iff 8St+i < 1 (resp., 6St+i > 1).
Write
Rt = max { 1 - 6St+i , 0}
for the rent at t and
oo
At = J26'-'Rs (7)
s=t
for the present value of all future rents. Under this notation V satisfies the simple difference
equation in the next lemma. This lemma immediately follows from a result in Yildiz (2002);
a complete proof is provided, because the proof explains the equilibrium behavior in detail.
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Lemma 4. Given any (m,i) and i,
VI (m) = P' (p, = i\m, t) Rt + <5£' (V;Vi|m, t) . (8)
Proof. There are two cases. First consider the case that 6St+i > 1, when Rt = 0.
Assume that Player 1 is recognized. Now, both players are willing to agree on a division
u = (ti^,u^) onljf if u^ > i5V^t+i {m + 1) and u^ > SV^^ (m + 1), requiring that u^ + u^ >
^^+1 ("^ + 1) + ^^4+1 ("^ + 1) = SSt+i > 1, an impossibility. Therefore the players cannot
agree. Similarly, they cannot agree when Player 2 is recognized either. Hence, V^ (m) =
P' {pt = l\m,t)6V^\, (m + 1) + F' (ft = 2\m,t) SV^Vi (m) = 6E^ {V^i\m,t).
Now consider the case 6St+i < 1- Assume that Player 1 is recognized. Player 2 accepts
an offer w iff u^ > 6Vt\^ {m + 1). Since 1 - (JV^+i (m + 1) > ^V/^j (m + 1), Player 1 now
offers (l — SV^^-^ {m + 1) ,6V^-^ (m + 1)), and the offer is accepted. Likewise, if Player 2 is
recognized, he offers (^V^^i {m) , 1 — 6V^_^_-^ ("^))i which is accepted. The continuation value
of Player 1 at {m, t) is
V/(m) := P'{p,^l\m.,t){l-6Vtl,{m + l))+PHp, = 2\m,t)6Vt\,{m)
=
pi
(ft = l\m,t) (1 - 6St+i) + 6E' (V;Vi|m,i)
=
pi(^j
= l|m,i)Pt + 6P^(yt^+i|m,i).
Similarly, V^^ (to) = p2 (^^ ^ 2|m, i) Pt + ^^^ (Vt+i|m, t).
That is, the continuation value of a player i at the beginning of t is the rent he expects
to extract at t
,
plus the present value of his continuation value at the beginning of the next
date. The expectations are taken using his own beliefs. This leads to simple expressions
for V and 5 in terms of A:
Lemma 5. Given any {m,t) and i & N,
y/(m) = pi{m)At (9)
St = {l+yt)At. (10)
Proof. By the law of iterated expectations, the solution to the difference equation
(8) IS
CXD OO
s=t s=t
where the second and the third equalities are due to the definitions of p] {m) and A(,
respectively. Summing up (9) over the players, one can obtain (10). (See Yildiz (2000) for
details.)
Equation (9) establishes that a player's bargaining power is determined by the recogni-
tion process, justifying the modeling of optimism in this paper. It states that the continu-
ation value of a player at any {m,t) is the present value of the rents he expects to extract
when he is recognized in the future. Due to the specific belief structure assumed in (1),
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player i assigns the same probability p] (m) for his recognition at each date in the future.
Hence this present value is simply the probability pj (m) times the present value At of all
the future rents. This further implies (10), which states that the perceived size St of the
pie at (m, t) is the present value A( of the rents in the future, inflated by the optimism
parameter (1 + yt)- Note that V^ {m) depends on m, while St is deterministic.
Characterizing agreement. By (10), there is an agreement regime at any t— 1 e T
if and only if
At < TTT^ = A. (11)
o(i + yt)
Recall that there is an agreement regime at each t > tQ—1. Write PA = {t e T\As < L>s Vs > t}
for the interval of the dates t such that there is an agreement regime at each s > t. As
to - 1 G PA, PA is non-empty.
Bounds for equilibrium payoffs. Define
D- 1 A 0-1XD 1 - -^ (yt+i - yt+2)Bt = ——z and Bf = 1 - 6ijt+iBt+i = ——
1 + oyt+i 1 + byt+2
In the rest of this subsection I will show that ^f < A( < Bt at each t e PA. This is the
main technical step in this paper. The bounds are plotted in Figure 1. Notice that the
bounds are very tight. This is generally true, as Bt-i < B_t < Bt- Moreover, the bounds
are valid only when t G PA, because the proof is based on the following recursive equation,
which holds only at agreement regimes.
Lemma 6. For any t, if 8St+\ < 1, then At = 1 — 5yt+iAt+i.
Proof. Assume 6St+i < 1- Then, Rt = I - 8St+i. Hence (10) yields Rt = I - 6{l +
yt+i)At+i- Hence, by (7), At = Rt + 6At+i = 1 - 6yt+iAt+i.
Define the sequences B and C by St = Bt-i and Ct = ^^^^yqij^— , respectively. Note
that Bt < Bi < Bt < Ct at each t. Using Lemma 6, one can easily prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 7. Given any t e PA, and 6, c G M, we have
At+i = Bt+i - b <=^ At = Bt + 6yt+ib, (12)
A(+i = C(+i + c <s=> At = Sf - 5yt+ic. (13)
By Lemma 7, At < Bt whenever At+i > Bt+i, and At > Bt whenever At+i < Ct+i-
Hence,
Lemma 8. Criven any t e PA, if Bt+i < At+i < Cj+i, then Bt < At < Bt.
Lemma 9. For any t e PA, Bt < At < Ct-
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Figure 1: Functions D, B, B, and A (5 = 0.99, n = 3, A = 1; i; = t* = 6, and
U. ^ 6.46.)
Proof. Take any t e PA, and define Of by setting 6'* = 1 and 6^ = 11^=4+1 i-^Vk) at
each s > t. Using Lemma 7 and mathematical induction on I, one can easily check that
At = Ct +
f)t+2l
[At+2( - Ct+2l] - 2Z \ [Ct+2k — Bt+2k\ (14)
0<k<l-l
for each t 6 PA, and I > 0, where I use the convention that summation over the empty set
is zero.
Equation (14) implies that At < Ct when I is sufficiently large. To see this, note first
that, since |— <5yt| < 1, as 2 —> 00, ^j"*"^' -^ 0. Since |At+2i — C't+2;| < 1 at each t,l, it follows
that, as Z ^ 00, ^j"*"^' {At+21 — Q+Zi] —^ 0. Second, 9^'^'^'' > for each k, as it consists of
multiplication of evenly many negative numbers. Since Ct+2k — -B(+2fc is always positive, it
follows that Ylo<k<l-i
^j"*"^*^ [Ct+2k — Bt+2k] is positive, increasing in I, and hence bounded
away from zero. Therefore, there exists a non-negative integer I' such that
0*+2i [A,^2; - Ct+2i] - Y. ^t^''^ [^'+2^^ - ^'+2fc] < (15)
0<fc<Z-l
whenever / > Z', whence A( < Ct by (14).
On the other hand, using (14) at i + 1 and (13), one can also obtain
!^t — Bt- ($yt+i6'(^_j [Af+2/-i-i - Ct+2i+\] Sy,t+T. Y^
^t+l+2fc
jQ_^j_^2fc - Bt+l+2k]
(16)
0<k<l-l
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Of course, by (15), there exists some non-negative integer I" such that
-6yt+ie'+f+' [At+2/+i - Ct+2i+i] + Syt+i Y. ^ttf
""' [Ct+2k+i - B/.+2fc+i] > (17)
0<fc</-l
whenever I > I", whence A( > Bt by (16). Therefore, for any I > max{l' ,1"], inequahties
(15) and (17) simultaneously hold. Hence, by (14) and (16), Bt < At < Ct-
Lemma 10. For all t G PA, Bt < At < Bt-
Proof. Take any t G PA. By Lemma 9, Bt+i < At+i < Ct+i, hence by Lemma 8,
Bt<At< Bf U
Lemma 11. For each t G PA, Bf < At < Bt-
Proof. For any t G PA, observe that i + 1 G PA, and hence, by the last lemma,
At+i < Bt+i, and therefore by Lemma 6, Af = 1 — 6yt+iAt+i > B_f "
A. 2. Proof of Theorem 1. First observe that, by definition,
Bt<Dt ^=^ yt- yt+i < ^^. (18)
Since yt —yt+i is decreasing in t and approaches as i —* oo, there exists some real number
tu such that Bt < Dt if and only if t > <„. Now, assume yt — yt+i < (1 — 5) /6. Then,
t > tu, and hence As < Bg < Dg for each s >t, showing that t — 1 G PA.
A. 3. Proof of Theorem 2. Take t* = rain PA. By definition, there is an agreement
regime at each t > t*, and hence it suffices to show that there is a disagreement regime
at each t < t* . If i* = 0, this is vacuously true, so assume that t* > 0. In that case,
t* — 1 < tu, and there is a disagreement regime at t* — 1. Now I will show that, whenever
there is a disagreement regime at any t < tu, there will also be a disagreement regime
at i — 1, showing by mathematical induction that there is a disagreement regime at each
s < t* — 1. To this end, take some t < t^ with a disagreement regime so that St+i > l/S.
Since i?t = 0, At = 6At+i. By (10), this yields
St = (1 + yt)oAt+i = -— St+i.
1 + yt+i
Hence, St > St+i whenever 6{l + yt) > l+yt+i, i.e., whenever yt — |'yt+i > ^-j^- But this is
true: yt+i > and t < tu, hence yt - |j/t+i > J/t - yt+i > ^- Therefore, St > St+i > 1/5,
and hence there is a disagreement regime at t — 1.
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A.4. Proof ofLemma 1 . The upper bound tu is computed by setting a +n)(t +n+i) ~
(1 - 6) /6. Since yt - yt+i = (t+n)(f+n+i) ' (1^) yields t* < max{0,i„}. To compute ti, use
the lower bound Bt for Af . Check that Bf > Dt if and only if t satisfies (5). By Lemma 11,
s = t-\- n satisfies (5) only if i < <„, hence there exists the largest integer t; that satisfies
(5), and ti < tu- Clearly, At, >Bt, > L*t, , yielding disagreement at ti — 1. Hence, ti — l<t*
and therefore f/ <*t*.
A.5. ' Proof of Theorem 5. Given any A;, let t* (fc), f; (fc), and t„ (A:) be the settlement
time and its lower and upper bounds, respectively, defined in Lemma 1 for the parameters
6 = e~'^/^, n = irk and A = yc,n. Write r*, t;, and r^ for the limits of T{t*{k),k),
T [U (fc) , k), and r {t^ (fc) , k), respectively, as A: —> oo. Define uj = nyo/r.
Towards proving the first statement, note that 6 = e"''/*^ = 1 — r/k for large values of
k. Hence, by (4), tu {k) = (vT+icJfc^— l)/2 — -rrk so that t„ = lim^^oo tu (k) /k = y/uj — it
as claimed. To prove the second statement, for any given t, write s = t + n and a = s/k =
T {t, k) + TT. When k is large, we also have 6 = e"''!^ = 1 - r/k and [ka +\) /k = a =
{ka + 2) /k. Substituting these in (5), one can check that / = rfc^ [a^ — u)o + w^r] . Then,
by Theorem 1 , t* > ct — tt whenever
(j) = a^ - u)a + u?r < 0.
Note that (p has a local minimum at o; = ywv/S. If j/oTrr < 4/27, then (j> is negative at ct,
showing that t* > a; — tt as desired.^ The last statement in the theorem follows from the
fact that as TT -^ 0, yoT^r —> and thus r* > ^/uJ/3 — n —^ oo.
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